Let Me Vote!
An experimental study of vote rotation in
committees by Bosman, R. et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
7-1-2013 
Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in 
committees 
R. Bosman 
VU University Amsterdam 
P. Maier 
Bank of America 
V. Sadiraja 
Georgia State University 
F. van Winden 
University of Amsterdam 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Bosman, R.; Maier, P.; Sadiraja, V.; and van Winden, F., "Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation 
in committees" (2013). ExCEN Working Papers. 47. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/47 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
Let Me Vote!
An experimental study of vote rotation in
committees
R. Bosman†, P. Maier†
′
, V. Sadiraj‡, F. van Winden
†VU University Amsterdam, †′Bank of America
‡Georgia State University∗, University of Amsterdam
Abstract
We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting
improves a committee’s performance, and (ii) the extent to which rota-
tion critically influences collective and individual welfare. The experiment
is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off between individual and
common interests. Our findings indicate that the choice of rotation scheme
has important consequences: it ‘pays’ to be allowed to vote, as voting com-
mittee members earn significantly more than non-voting members. Hence,
rotation is not neutral. We also find that smaller committees decide faster
and reach a deadlock less often. This reduces reported frustration among
committee members.
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1 Introduction
In many areas of economic policymaking, committees are used to arrive at de-
cisions. Well-known examples are: international trade (WTO), international
cooperation (UN Security Council), monetary policy (European Central Bank),
and public governance (European Union).
At least since Condorcet began the formal study of decision making by com-
mittees in the 18th century, it has been known that committees can be an
efficient means of aggregating information. At the same time, practical expe-
rience suggests that committees can lead to endless discussion.1 Hence, ways
have been sought to improve a committee’s ability to reach an agreement in a
satisfactory way with regard to the interests involved and the time required.
One such way is the implementation of a rotation scheme, that is to restrict
the right to vote to a rotating basis. However, remarkably little is known about
what rotation precisely entails for actual policymaking.
To illustrate the potential consequences of rotation, consider U.S. monetary
policy. Monetary decisions are made by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. The FOMC is comprised of seven
Board members, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and
four out of the eleven regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents. The latter
serve one-year terms on a rotating basis. Chappell et al. (2004) argue that
the non-voting FOMC members do not significantly influence FOMC decision
making: ‘The results indicate that non-voting alternates have no appreciable
influence over policy outcomes... If policymaking in the FOMC is consensual,
that consensus does not appear to encompass the views of non-voting members’
(Chappell et al., 2004, p. 418). The FOMC case suggests that rotating commit-
tees run a risk that decisions may be biased towards the individual interests of
the voting members currently permitted to vote. Rotation may speed up deci-
sion making (because it involves smaller committees), but potentially at higher
social costs if conflicts exist between common and individual interests. Because
of the wide application of committee decision making, an interesting question is
the extent to which these findings can be generalized. To study this issue, and
other aspects of committee decision making, laboratory experiments can be a
useful tool because the environment can be controlled and the decision-making
1‘Had Newton served on more faculty committees at Cambridge, his first law of motion
might have read: A decisionmaking body at rest or in motion tends to stay at rest or in
motion in the same direction unless acted upon by an outside force’ (Blinder, 1998).
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process can be replicated.
In this paper we investigate the effects of rotation on committee decision
making in an experiment using a simple perfect information framework, thereby
removing the complexity that uncertainty may introduce into the analysis.2 We
are interested in the following research questions: Is rotation a useful tool to
increase a committee’s efficiency? Does the type of rotation scheme matter?
Does rotation lead to frustration with negative behavioral consequences? Does
a temporary lack of the right to vote result in non-voters ‘being ripped off’? To
explore these questions we design an experiment whereby committee members
have to trade-off between private and committee payoffs. We examine three
cases: (i) no rotation, where every group member is allowed to vote; (ii) equal
rotation, where only some group members are allowed to vote but every member
rotates at the same rate; (iii) unequal rotation, where one member has perma-
nent voting rights, whereas the others rotate at the same rate. In addition, we
explore several psychological factors, such as the players’ emotions (see Thagard
and Kroon, 2006).
Our main findings are the following: Rotation increases a committee’s effi-
ciency in terms of total earnings, but it also increases the inequality of earnings.
The right to vote ‘pays off’ in the sense that voting members neglect the interests
of the non-voting members. However, decisions made by committees without
rotation are blocked with greater frequency, generating efficiency losses. More-
over, committee members blocking decisions are punished by other committee
members, even though the punishment is only possible after the end of the vote
rotation experiment. This points at behavioral spill-over effects, which appear
to be related to experienced negative emotions. Lastly, all committee members
could increase their earnings by voting for the option with the highest total
payoff for the group as a whole. By voting for their own (short-term) interests,
the voting members end up in a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’-like situation where each
committee member earns less.
Our analysis is related to experimental ‘design’ studies, involving the economist
as ‘engineer’ (Roth, 2002). In these studies, experiments are used as tools to fill
the gap between theory and design. Consider EU enlargement: As more and
more countries become EU members, European committees risk becoming too
large, and ways should be sought to increase their efficiency. Our results indi-
2For an experimental study that explores the effect of uncertainty on committee decision
making see, for e.g., Blinder and Morgan (2005) who find that groups make better decisions
than individuals in such settings; Lombardelli et al. (2005) report similar findings.
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cate that rotation reduces the likelihood of a deadlock. However, these benefits
come at a cost, namely distributional effects. Given our results it may not be
a surprise why smaller EU countries are worried about losing power under a
rotation scheme.
There are a few experimental studies that look at the impact of rotation on
committee decision making. Studies closest to ours are Waldner et al. (2003),
Montero et al. (2008), Kagel et al. (2010) and Drouvelis et al. (2010).3 Each
of these studies offers scattered empirical evidence shedding light on separate
questions addressed in our study, such as the impact of : (i) the size of the com-
mittees, (ii) weighted majority rule on aggregation of preferences and (iii) veto
players on committee performance in a public good provision or distributional
settings. Waldner et al. (2003) examine the effect of rotation on the voluntary
provision of an excludable public good. They find evidence of a temptation to
exclude outsiders from the benefits of the good. Montero et al. (2008) study
the paradox of new members, namely committee enlargement may increase the
power of some existing voters. The framework is distribution of a given bud-
get and a weighted majority rule is used to aggregate votes. They conclude
that data in their experiment are consistent with the paradox of new members.
Kagel et al. (2010) examine the role of a veto player on committee decision
making in a bargaining game with no limit on the number of stages but delayed
agreements are costly; the rule of aggregation of votes of non-veto players is
the majority rule. They find that veto players have a negative effect on the
committee performance and that the power of veto players is negatively cor-
related with delay costs. The non-experimental literature focuses on various
aspects of committee decision making. For example, several authors examine
the ability of committees to pool and process information (e.g., Bulkley et al.,
2001; Blinder, 2004).4 Mueller (2003) offers an excellent source for theoretical
properties of different decision rules and procedures, particularly in situations
where conflicting preferences promote manipulation (see also, Li et al., 2001
and Bernheim et al., 2006). Another strand of the literature focuses on private
versus public information, which enables strategic interaction among committee
members. Gerling et al. (2003) provides an overview of studies in this area.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the experimental design. Results
3For a review of (classical) experimental studies on legislative bargaining and spatial voting
see Kagel et al. (2010, p.170-171).
4A committee ‘...is superfluous if it possesses no special expertise and informational inef-
ficiency is increasing in the uncertainty associated with the policy.’ (Gilligan and Krehbiel,
1990).
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are presented in section 3. The final section 4 concludes.
2 Design and behavioral considerations
2.1 Experimental design
The experiment was set up such that each committee member faces a trade-off
between ‘own’ and ‘common’ interests.5 This reflects the idea that committees
as a whole often have a stake in the decision taken while individual committee
members may have their own (private) interests as opposed to the common
interest when these interests are in conflict. Each committee is comprised of
five members and decides among four options.6 Depending on the decision
made by the committee each player receives:
• a private payoff (see example below) and, in addition,
• a common payoff. The common payoff is a weighted average of the private
payoffs capturing a collective welfare. In calculating the weighted average
three players’ payoffs are weighted 10% each, and the other two players’
payoffs are weighted 35% each; this can be interpreted as players repre-
senting ‘small’ and ‘large’ regions. The common payoff ensures that an
’appropriate’ policy choice results in welfare gains for the committee as a
whole.
The total payoff for each player is the sum of the private and the common
payoffs. The incentive structure, according to total payoffs is characterized by a
single-peaked, symmetric distribution to ensure a unique voting equilibrium. In
each round, the peak of the distribution varies by region. However, the peaks
of the distributions are chosen in such a way that over all rounds, every player
experiences a peak at option 1, option 2, etc. equally often.7
Table 1 provides an example (with payoffs in eurocents). For each option
the private payoffs for each region are shown in the top five rows. The sixth
row (labeled Common payoff) shows the common payoff; it is the weighted sum
5All experimental sessions were run at the Creed Laboratory of the University of Amster-
dam. Subjects were recruited online and through announcements on bulletin boards. Each
experimental session lasted about 2.5 hours and average earnings per subject were 44.4 euros.
6We use the terms ‘players’, ‘committee members’ and ‘regions’ interchangeably. Note that
this interpretation was not given to subjects during the experiment. The instructions given
to the participants (and read aloud by the experimenter) and descriptions of the rotation
schemes are available from the authors upon request.
7An overview of the distribution of the peaks over the rounds is available upon request.
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Table 1: Example of the distribution of payoffs (in eurocents)
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Player 1 350 200 100 25
Player 2 200 350 200 100
Private payoff Player 3 25 100 200 350
Player 4 350 200 100 25
Player 5 350 200 100 25
Common payoff 265 242.5 145 83.75
Player 1 615 442.5 245 108.75
Total payoff Player 2 465 592.5 345 183.75
(=private + Player 3 290 342.5 345 433.75
common payoffs) Player 4 615 442.5 245 108.75
Player 5 615 442.5 245 108.75
Large players (members, regions) are in bold print; weights of small and large countries
are 10% and 35% respectively.
of the private payoffs (note that players 2 and 5 are given the weight of ‘large’
regions, i.e., 35% each). Finally, the total payoffs, shown in the bottom five
rows, correspond to the sum of private and common payoffs. For example, if
option 1 is chosen, the total payoff for player 3 is 25+265=290 eurocents. To
isolate the effects of rotation and avoid distortions due to imperfect informa-
tion, we have implemented a full information setting, whereby every player has
full information about the other player’s incentive structure (i.e., every player
receives the information contained in table 1).
In this example player 3, say, faces the following situation: he maximizes
the committee payoff by voting for option 1, which in this example is also
the option with the largest common payoff. However, option 1 also yields the
lowest private (and total) payoff of all the options for player 3. On the other
hand, option 4 would maximize player 3’s total payoff, but would imply the
smallest common and total committee payoff. Because experimental evidence
suggests that (some) people care about efficiency in terms of total group payoffs
(Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) it is not obvious for which option player 3 will
eventually vote.8
8Note also that option 3 is the most fair one (in terms of payoff inequality) whereas option 2
maximizes the lowest payoff of the committee members. Experimental evidence on efficiency,
equity, and/or maximin as defining characteristics of other-regarding preferences is mixed; For
direct tests of these properties see Cox and Sadiraj (2012).
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When designing the decision-making procedure, we aimed to mimic the func-
tioning of political committees or international organizations, such as the WTO,
the EU Commission or the UN Security Council. Suppose that the committee
is negotiating the text of an international treaty. In practice this entails making
different proposals, voting on these proposals, and accepting or rejecting them.
This continues until a decision has been reached. In the end, every committee
member has to agree upon a common text. We try to capture the most impor-
tant elements of this procedure in the following stylized way. In each round a
sequence of players is chosen to make a proposal and this is common knowledge.9
A proposal that is unanimously supported is implemented. If the proposal is
vetoed by any player, the next proposer in the sequence makes a proposal. In
our experiment, an option can only be proposed once and each voting committee
member has the power to veto any given proposal (except one’s own).10
Reaching an agreement requires that no one blocks the proposal. In the ex-
periment, if four options are vetoed, the committee is declared ’deadlocked’ and
each participant is paid 10 eurocents. The payoff from a deadlocked committee
is considerably less than the payoff from ‘the worst alternative option’. This
captures the idea that if, say, the WTO cannot agree on a reduction of tariffs,
every participant is worse off. In the experiment – as arguably in real life –
every subject knows this in advance.
We investigate three decision-making procedures (experimental treatments):
• No rotation (NR): In each round all five committee members vote; three
members can make proposals (if three proposals are rejected, the remain-
ing option is automatically voted upon).
• Equal rotation (ER): In each round only three members who can make
proposals (in the round) are permitted to vote. Regardless of the size of
the region, all committee members rotate equally often; each player votes
and can make a proposal in 60% of the rounds.
• Unequal rotation (UR): In each round only three members who can make
proposals are permitted to vote. One large region votes in every round
whereas the other large region rotates with the same frequency as the
9The experiment is set up so that over all rounds, every player gets to make the first,
second, or third proposal equally often. Subjects were informed about this.
10A similar procedure is used in Fre´chette et al. (2003), where bargaining in legislatures is
studied.
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small regions; each rotating player can make a proposal and vote in 50%
of the rounds.
The rationale behind granting permanent representation to one large region is
to investigate whether permanent representation (i.e., knowing that one player
will always vote and can make a proposal) leads to differences in outcomes: As
the two large regions differ only in that respect, differences in voting patterns
or earnings between these two (otherwise identical) regions can be attributed to
permanent representation. It should be noted that all players have full access to
all information in every round (including voting patterns), regardless of whether
or not they are allowed to vote in a particular round. It will be useful (to follow
the data analysis) to keep in mind that non-voting players (who lack the right
to vote and/or make a proposal) in ER and UR are disadvantaged in the NR
treatment because, although they can vote, they never get to make a proposal.
There were 225 subjects in this experiment; each subject participated in
only one treatment. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of five at the
beginning of the experiment and remained with their group for all rounds. Each
group played 50 rounds under the scheme ‘no rotation’ and ‘equal rotation’ and
48 rounds under ‘unequal rotation’.11 To counter income effects, subjects were
paid only for 10 rounds randomly chosen at the end of the experiment. It is
important to note that committee members are provided conflicting incentives,
as the option yielding the highest individual payoff differs among the members.
However, over all rounds, subjects face similar possibilities to ‘earn and exploit’,
in the sense that: (i) each member experiences equally often the maximal payoff
at option 1, option 2, etc., (ii) each player has similar positions in the voting
procedure (i.e., every player has equal opportunities to make the first, second or
third proposal), and (iii) each member votes an equal number of times.12 These
features of the experiment were public information.
To investigate affective responses towards other group members, we use the
following methods:
• During the experiment participants were asked to rate their mood on
a scale of 1 (very happy) to 9 (very unhappy) after every 10th round
11The total number of rounds in a treatment is determined by the number of rounds required
to make possible that each subject experiences the same number of times being first, second
and third to make a proposal (and therefore also vote in rotation treatments). The difference
between 50 and 48 rounds in ER and UR follows from having one player never rotate in UR.
12The only exception is, of course, one large country in the unequal rotation treatment.
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(beginning with round 5).13
• At the end of the experiment, the earnings of all subjects were calculated
and reported individually. Following the end of the experiment, subjects
were invited to participate in a debriefing procedure. Any subject was
free to decline participation in the debriefing procedure and leave the lab
with his or her earnings from the experiment. Subjects who accepted the
invitation to participate were asked to fill out a questionnaire and were
given the opportunity to reward or penalize other subjects who stayed for
the debriefing procedure.14 Each subject received an initial payment of
600 eurocents for filling out the questionnaire. This payment could be
pocketed, or used to reward or punish other players in one’s group by
up to 75 eurocents per player. Since each eurocent spent for rewards or
punishment costs one eurocent, each player could use up to 300 eurocents
in total to reward or punish four other players. Similarly, each player
could be rewarded or punished by others with the maximum of 300 euro-
cents. This behavioral option was added to the experiment to investigate
emotional spill-over effects of committee decision making. Such spill-over
effects may be an important feature of real life committees (Thagard and
Kroon, 2006), and an improved understanding may facilitate the design
of better committee decision-making policies.15
• During the debriefing procedure, but before the reward or punishment
option, subjects were also asked to report their emotions by rating the ex-
perienced intensity of thirteen different emotions on 7-point scales (ranging
from ‘no emotion at all’ to ‘high intensity of the emotion’). The list in-
cludes the following emotions: irritation, anger, contempt, envy, jealousy,
sadness, joy, happiness, shame, fear, surprise, pride, and relief.16
13’Self-report is the most common and potentially the best way to measure a person’s emo-
tional experiences’: Robinson and Clore (2002, p.934). We use the Self-Assessment Manikin,
a figure with a face changing from a very happy to a very sad expression (Lang, 1980).
14As it turned out, no subject declined participation.
15The only way to study such emotional spill-over effects in a clean way is after the experi-
ment itself – without giving subjects information about it. If subjects would know in advance
they can punish or reward, this could change their behavior in the committee decision-making
experiment. To avoid effects on future experiments, we decoupled the punishment/reward
procedure completely from the experiment and made it part of the (optional) debriefing ques-
tionnaire.
16Apart from the negative emotions that are expected to be particularly relevant for reci-
procity (anger, irritation) some other negative as well as positive emotions were included
as filler items, to avoid pushing participants in a particular direction (see Bosman and van
Winden, 2002).
9
2.2 Behavioral considerations
Based on economic theory, there are a variety of hypotheses concerning sub-
ject behavior and outcomes of the experiment; we look at the following five
behavioral modes:
• Strategic voting: Subjects behave strategically in proposing options and
vetoing others’ proposals (as is normally assumed in the game theory
literature);17
• Quasi-naive voting: Subjects lack sophisticated strategic behavior: they
propose and accept the option that gives them the highest total payoff,
and always accept the last proposal to prevent a ’deadlocked’ committee
and the resulting inferior payoff;
• Maximum committee payoff (’efficiency’): Subjects propose and accept
options that maximize the sum of the total payoffs over all members. This
behavioral mode provides a benchmark for how much the group as a whole
could have earned; it can be viewed as the socially efficient behavior.
• Maximum common payoff: Subjects propose and accept options that
maximize common payoffs.18 The option that maximizes common payoff
may be perceived as a good compromise by players and therefore it may
serve as a focal point for coordinating voting behavior because it offers a
common payoff that is equally shared by everyone.
• Median voter decisive: Although the voting procedure in our experiment
is ’voting by veto’, the median voter preferences might still be a good
predictor of the voting outcome.19 The median voter corresponds to the
median of the voting members for the ER and UR treatments whereas in
case of the NR treatment it is the median committee member (since every
member has the right to vote in this treatment).
17Because players have perfect information in each round, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium for each round. Although the (round) SPE outcome may be attainable via different
paths, the outcome is unique. We focus in the SPE outcome in each round in the analysis of
the empirical performance of this mode.
18A quick inspection of tables 5/6 (Appendix A) reveals that in only 7 (out of 50) rounds in
NR and ER, options that maximize total committee payoffs and common payoffs are different;
different predictions also occur in only 7 (out of 48) rounds in the UR treatment.
19Blinder and Morgan (2005) find no differences between group decisions made by majority
rule and unanimity.
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Overall in the experiment voting for the maximum committee payoff also max-
imizes each player’s total payoff. This follows from the fact that procedures
in our experiment are fair: each player finds himself in an advantageous situa-
tion equally often.20 It should be noted, however, that in many rounds players
have an incentive to deviate from maximizing the committee payoff by choosing
options that maximize their (round) individual payoffs.
We have derived theoretical predictions for the ‘winning option’ for each
mode (see Appendix A for details). In addition, to be able to test performance
of committees in terms of time efficiency we have also identified the (shortest)
path to the winning option for strategic voting, i.e., the shortest path from
the first proposal to the final decision required to implement (round) SPE out-
comes. Furthermore, figures on several performance measures for each of the
five benchmark modes described above can be found in the top rows of table
5 (Appendix A): The foregone efficiency corresponds to the (percentage rate)
difference between the total committee payoff at the option predicted by a be-
havioral mode in a round and the highest possible total committee payoff in the
respective round); The foregone equity, on the other hand, is calculated as the
(rate) difference between the Gini Index at the option predicted by a behavioral
mode in a round and the smallest Gini Index (in the respective round). We have
also included figures on the range of payoffs (highest minus lowest payoff) as
another measure of inequality. Closer inspection of the figures in these five rows
of table 5 reveal that it depends on the weights one attaches to the different
measures which behavioral mode is socially to be preferred. For example, taking
a shortfall of less than 2% from maximal efficiency and a Gini Index of no more
than 0.1 as a selection criterion, only the mode of ’median voter decisive’ in the
NR treatment passes the test. In both ER and UR it is not clear which mode
is socially preferable as either foregone efficiency or the Gini Index violates the
postulated criterion; ’Maximum committee payoff’ mode (see the TP column
in table 5) comes close to being the socially preferred mode in the presence of
rotation.
20There is only one exception to this: the player that never rotates in the unequal rotation
treatment.
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3 Results
3.1 Does rotation affect earnings?
Arguably the most interesting question under the investigation here is whether
vote rotation leads to differences in earnings. Theoretically, the outcomes of
’maximum committee payoff’ and ’maximum common payoff’ modes obviously
are not affected by who has the right to vote and/or propose since the outcomes
are determined by the payoffs of all committee members. However, differences
in earnings are expected in case of behavioral modes with outcomes that favor
voting members in rotation treatments; such modes include ’strategic voting’
and ’median voter decisive’.21 An indicator of the differences in earnings is a
high rate of foregone equity (see table 5, Appendix A); the foregone equity for
the ’strategic voting’ mode (the SV column in table 5) is 44% when all five
committee members have the right to vote (NR) but the figure jumps to 80%
and 65% when two committee members lack the right to vote (ER and UR);
similarly, for the ’median voter decisive’ mode (the MV column in table 5) the
foregone equity figures are 54% in NR and up to 78% and 65% in ER and UR.
It is an empirical question then whether regions are correct in fearing that they
will be ’ripped off’ if they are not allowed to vote. We report on two pieces of
evidence, within and between treatments, that support the conclusion that vote
rotation affects the distribution of income among committee members.
Before discussing the data, it will help to recall that in the rotation treat-
ments only three members have the right to make a proposal and vote, whereas
in the no rotation treatment, although again only three members have the right
to make proposals, all five members have the right to vote. As an example, let
players 3, 2 and 4 be the ones who can successively make a proposal. Players
1 and 5 cannot make a proposal in any treatment, but they do have the right
to vote in the NR treatment. In the rotation treatments, in the same situation
player 3 would still propose first, player 2 second and player 4 last, but players
1 and 5 now have no right to vote and, of course, no right to propose any option
for consideration.
21The outcomes of ’quasi-naive’ voting mode are unlikely to favor proposers (who are also
the only committee members with the right to vote in ER and UR) since according to that
mode a proposer proposes his first-best (feasible) option and a voter rejects any option that
is not her first-best (feasible) option; so, early proposals most likely will be rejected unless
preferences of all voters are completely aligned, an event with a likelihood that is negatively
correlated with a voting committee size.
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Earnings of voting versus non-voting members
The experimental design is such that the setup of the NR and ER treatments
is exactly the same except that in each round two committee members who
are not proposers in NR are not allowed to vote in ER. Thus, we can directly
compare earnings of committee members in ER in any round with the earn-
ings of the corresponding committee members in NR in that round. We group
committee members into two categories: those who have the right to vote when
the rotation scheme is implemented, and those who lack the right to vote. For
these two categories, Figure 1 shows the deviation from average earnings. We
observe an increase in earnings for the voting members who retain voting power
(i.e., proposers), whereas earnings of the non-voting committee members (i.e.,
non-proposers) fall. It is also noticeable that rotation leads to a higher ‘polar-
ization’ of earnings for the difference in earnings between voting and non-voting
committee members increases as a result of rotation.
We find that proposers in ER earn about 6% more than proposers in NR,
whereas non-proposers (who have the right to vote in NR but lack this right in
ER) earn about 2.5% less in ER than in NR.22 These differences in earnings of
the two types of committee members between the NR and the ER treatments are
statistically significant at conventional levels (t-test; for proposers, p = 0.00; for
non-proposers, p = 0.02). Next, we look at earnings of voting and non-voting
members within a rotation treatment. ER and UR data both reject the null
hypothesis of earnings being drawn from the same distribution in favor of the
alternative hypothesis of higher earnings for voting members: a voting member
(i.e., a proposer) earns 11% more than a non-voting member in ER and 12%
more in UR (t-test: p < 0.01 in both ER and UR). This difference in earnings
(around 23 euros overall) is due to two factors:
• the right to propose, and
• the right to vote.
To disentangle the effects of the right to propose and the right to vote on higher
earnings we use data from the NR treatment. We find that proposers in NR
earn only 2% (or 4.5 euros overall) more than non-proposers (t-test, p = 0.07).
As all committee members have the right to vote in NR, this modest difference
in earnings is only due to having the right to propose.
22See Appendix B for statistical tests and detailed earnings of proposers (i.e., voting mem-
bers in ER) and non-proposers (i.e., non-voting members in ER) in NR, ER and UR.
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Figure 1: Deviation from average earnings of voting vs. non-voting committee
members.
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We conclude that data in our experiment are consistent with the hypotheses
that: (i) committee members who lack the right to vote earn significantly less
and (ii) having the right to make a proposal in addition to having the right to
vote further boosts earnings in the rotation treatments but less so in the no
rotation treatment. Committee members are correct in fearing that they will
be ’ripped off’ when they are not allowed to vote.
The right to vote and earnings across regions of different sizes
The question we take up in this section is: Do big regions have to fear more than
small ones by the lack of the right to vote? We find that in the ER treatment,
earnings of small regions are 5.4% higher when they have the right to vote,
while big regions receive even 20% extra. In the UR treatment, the right to
vote increases earnings of small regions by almost 11% and the rotating large
country earns almost 15% more (earnings in eurocents are displayed in figure
2.23 Data on earnings are characterized by substantial distributional effects.
Big regions gain more than small regions when they can vote. On the other
hand, they have more to lose if they are not allowed to vote. In the unequal
rotation treatment we see a similar pattern, although the differences in earnings
between big and small regions are less pronounced. These effects do not stem
23This earnings pattern is also confirmed in panel regressions with subject fixed effects.
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Figure 2: Influence of the right to vote on earnings
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from big countries having better earning opportunities, as the payoffs for big
and small countries are exactly the same by design. We think that this is due
to the attractiveness of the total committee payoff in voting (see section 3.2),
and the bigger weight of the larger regions in the determination of the common
payoff.24
Lastly, similar results are found when examining differences in earnings be-
tween the two big regions. Recall that the two are identical, except that in the
unequal rotation case one region was granted permanent voting rights. Compar-
ing earnings within the UR treatment between the two big regions for rounds in
which the rotating region lacked the right to vote (i.e., for 24 out of 48 rounds),
we find the ‘permanent in’ region earns about 7% more than the ‘rotating’
region.
Rotation hardly changes total earnings
Summarizing, under rotation the voting committee members earn more than the
non-voting committee members. Given these distributional effects, one might
wonder whether rotation also influences the payoffs of the committee as a whole:
Does rotation expand the ‘pie’ or is the ‘pie’ simply distributed in a different
way? Figures on the foregone efficiency (see table 5, Appendix A) show that the
answer depends on the behavioral mode: the ’strategic voting’ mode predicts
24Recall that the maximum committee payoff is typically (but not always) obtained through
voting for the maximum common payoff.
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lower efficiency in NR than in ER, and lower in ER than in UR; on the contrary,
the ’median voter decisive’ mode predicts higher effiicency in NR than in UR,
and higher efficiency in UR than in ER; and of course, ’maximum common
payoff’ and ’maximum committee payoff’ both predict that rotation has no
effect on efficiency. What do our data show?
The left part of table 2 shows realized earnings per player for all three treat-
ments. On average, a committee member earns 438 eurocents per round in
the no rotation treatment. Average earnings are about 3% higher under ro-
tation (this difference is significant at the 5% and 10% level for ER and UR,
respectively).25 Hence, we conclude that rotation has primarily distributional
effects. The effect of rotation on total earnings of the committee seems marginal.
Further analysis reveals that the differences in earnings across treatments are
driven by the fact that less decisions are blocked under rotation. That said, the
maximum average earnings each player could have obtained per round was 492
eurocents.26 The right part of table 2 indicates how much (on average) could
have been gained, if all players had simply voted for the option that maximizes
committee payoff. In the rotation treatments, committee members could have
earned 9% and 8% more; without rotation earnings could have been around
11% higher. Additional tests indicate that voting for the option that maximizes
the committee payoff would have increased earnings of all committee members,
irrespective of the size. In other words, players do not (all) simply vote for
the option that maximizes the total payoff of the committee. In our experi-
ment players may not have been aware that a cooperative strategy would have
yielded the highest payoffs – but the same may hold, for e.g., in international
negotiations. As committee members vote for their own (stage-game) interests,
the committee ends up in a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation with each member
earning less.
3.2 Behavioral modes
To be able to better describe the conditions under which the choice of a decision-
making institution may affect the outcome we turn our attention to empirical
performance of different behavioral modes. Suppose, for instance, that all play-
ers aim to maximize the committee’s total payoff. In that case, the winning
option will not be affected by the composition of the committee. If, however,
25For detailed figures on average earnings and statistical tests see Appendix B.
26Maximum possible committee payoff is 2459 eurocents(see the second row of table 5 in
Appendix A); hence 492 eurocents per member.
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Table 2: Average earnings per player per round including vetoes (in eurocents)
All regions Av. payoff Possible gaina
No rotation 438 10.9 %
Equal rotation 450 8.6 %
Unequal rotation 454 7.8 %
aThe ‘possible gain’ is the difference between actual payoffs and the payoffs that could have
been realised by choosing the option that maximizes the total committee payoff in a given
round.
the participants vote strategically, the composition of the committee will be a
crucial factor in determining the outcome.
Overall, more than 88% of the results is consistent with at least one behav-
ioral mode. In what follows, we analyze the extent to which the behavior of the
participants is consistent with the different modes described in section 2.2.
Unfortunately, using actual voting behavior to distinguish among the alter-
native theoretical predictions is not as straightforward as it may seem, as in
many cases the theoretical predictions yield similar outcomes. We thus have to
find ways to distinguish between the various modes. We start by observing that
blocking a decision is inconsistent with all behavioral modes. Therefore, in what
follows we exclude rounds where the final option was vetoed. Figure 3 shows
the percentage of decisions that is consistent with each of the modes consid-
ered. Clearly the (quasi-) naive voting is not very prominent, and maximization
of the common payoff seems to do worse than strategic voting. Although the
decision-making procedure adopted in our experiment is based on unanimity it
is interesting to see that ’Median voter decisive’ seems to be able to explain a
large share of the outcomes.
Next we try to explore the degree to which players behave strategically.
To maximize the utilitization of our data, we take the behavioral modes two
by two, excluding rounds with identical (outcome) predictions and test which
mode performs best. Two such tests are displayed in table 3, where we report
percentages of rounds in which observed outcomes are consistent with the theo-
retical predictions. The upper half of table 3 reports test statistics for ‘median
voter decisive’ against ‘maximum committee payoff’ for those rounds where the
predicted outcomes are different. The predictions are sufficiently different to
test the two modes in all three treatments. Clearly, ’maximum committee pay-
off (committee efficiency)’ mode is not frequently observed in our experiment.27
27Similar results are found testing ‘median voter decisive’ against ‘maximum common pay-
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Figure 3: Empirical performance of different behavioral modes
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Note: Rounds with blocked decisions are excluded.
Table 3: Testing the behavioral modes (percentages of correct predictions)
No rotation Equal rotation Unequal rotation
Median voter decisive 42.9% 56.0% 55.1%
Max. committee payoff 29.7% 27.2% 28.9%
p-value χ2 test 0.1 0.0 0.0
Median voter decisive 50.4% - -
Strategic voting 39.3% - -
p-value χ2 test 0.0 - -
Note: Only rounds where the predictions differ are considered; rounds with blocked
decision are excluded. The ’median voter decisive’ and ’strategic voting’ yield identical
outcome predictions in the rotation treatments, which explains ’-’ entries in the table.
The lower half of table 3 shows p-values ( χ2 test) for strategic voting versus
the median voter decisive. Again, the behavioral mode ‘median voter decisive’
is more prominent, as it can explain more committee decisions than strategic
voting (a χ2 test reveals that the differences are statistically significant at 1%
level).
Since the two modes yield identical outcome predictions in the rotation treat-
ments (see tables 5/6 in Appendix A), to differentiate between ‘median voter
decisive’ and ‘strategic voting’ in these treatments, additional evidence is re-
quired. We postulate that for an outcome to be consistent with the ’median
voter decisive’ mode, the first proposal also needs to be the preferred outcome
off’.
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Table 4: Median voter decisive versus strategic voting (first proposals, percent-
age of correct predictions)
No rotation Equal rotation Unequal rotation
Median voter decisive 42.5% 43.9% 53.4%
Strategic voting 19.7% 22.1% 21.0%
p-value χ2 test 0.0 0.0 0.0
Note: Only rounds where the predicted first proposal differs are considered.
of the median voting member, whereas in the case of strategic voting the first
proposal must be consistent with the theoretical prediction.28 Table 4 reports
on the ability of these two behavioral modes to explain the first proposal ob-
served in those rounds where these two modes yield different predictions. Across
all treatments, ’median voter decisive’ significantly outperforms ’strategic vot-
ing’ (p-value <0.01). A similar comparison between ’median voter decisive’ and
’maximum committee payoff (efficiency)’ reveals that the ’median voter decisive’
mode better explains subjects’ behavior. Finally, looking at observed committee
decisions in the rounds where the median voting member differs across treat-
ments, we find that outcomes change accordingly in 71% of the cases. Overall,
we find that the ’median voter decisive’ mode can best describe the outcomes
of committee decision making; This holds irrespective of the voting procedure
(treatment).
With respect to strategic voting, figures in table 4 seem to suggest that
subjects find it easier to behave strategically in the rotation treatments, which
could be due to the fact that the backward induction is easier for committees
with three members than for committees with five members.29 Further analy-
sis indicates that in the rotation treatments, the predictive power of strategic
voting increases in later rounds, indicating that the ability of subjects to vote
strategically increases with experience.
3.3 Which decision-making procedure is preferred?
We have shown that implementation of a rotation scheme affects earnings and
induces distributional effects. However, there are also other ways to inves-
tigate the attractiveness of the various decision-making procedures. In what
28Note that in some cases various ‘paths’ lead to the same outcome. We only look at the
‘shortest’ path, i.e., the most direct way to obtain the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
option.
29However, one should be cautious about this since we find that the null hypothesis of first
proposals observed across treatments being drawn from the same distribution is not rejected.
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Figure 4: How long does it take to reach a decision?
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follows differences across treatments are discussed with regard to how quickly
decisions are reached, how many decisions are blocked, and how often the re-
ward/punishment option is utilized.
Do smaller committees make faster decisions?
To investigate whether rotation speeds up a committee’s ability to make deci-
sions, we examine how many proposals are made before a decision is reached.
Figure 4 shows how long does it take to reach a decision. The first proposal
was unanimously accepted in 41% and 38% of all cases under unequal and equal
rotation, respectively. In contrast, only 27% of first proposals were accepted in
the no rotation treatment. Clearly, with rotation decisions are made in earlier
phases of the decision-making process compared to no rotation. In addition, it
takes fewer proposals to reach an agreement in UR than in ER.30
This is consistent with our theoretical predictions. The shortest path to
a committee decision is never shorter without rotation, and in 37 rounds the
shortest path to a final agreement is shorter under unequal rotation. Hence, if
fast decision making is important, data in our experiment favor unequal rotation.
30All results are statistically significant (p < 0.01; Pearson χ2 test).
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Figure 5: Blocked decisions
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Why are deadlocks important?
Interestingly, introduction of a rotation scheme reduces the number of vetoes. In
the NR treatment we observe that in 41 rounds committees are deadlocked. In
rotation treatments this number is much lower: respectively, 15 and 17 rounds
in ER and UR.31 To test for habituation, we provide the number of deadlocked
committees for each treatment (Figure 5). The number of deadlocks fluctuates
somewhat over time, but there is no clearly significant declining pattern. Further
testing indicates that the relationship between the number of deadlocks and the
rotation schemes is stable over time suggesting that committees do not learn to
avoid deadlocks over time.
These findings also raise the question whether fewer deadlocks in rotation
treatments are the result of having fewer voting members, or whether each
voting member becomes less ‘likely’ to veto a proposal. The latter is the case.
In the NR treatment, the likelihood that an average committee member vetoes
the last proposal is 1.2%; in the ER and UR treatments the likelihood figures are
0.71% and 0.79%, respectively. Thus, voting members in the rotation treatments
are less likely to block the last proposal (similar results are found for earlier
proposals).
31The differences between NR and rotation treatments ER are statistically significant at
5% level (Pearson χ2 tests).
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Because the payoff for deadlocks is considerably lower than that of every
player’s least preferred option, one might argue that it is not rational to veto
the last proposal. However, deadlocks can be seen as a costly signal to the
other committee members that certain options are unacceptable. Emotions
such as anger may lead to deadlocks, but one can also use deadlocks to acquire
a ‘reputation’. That fewer deadlocks are observed under rotation appears to
have two important implications.
• First, it increases players’ satisfaction: groups that experienced deadlocks
are less happy than groups that always reach a decision. Comparing
groups in which decisions were deadlocked with groups where deadlocks
never occurred, we find that deadlocks have a negative effect on subjects’
happiness. This effect is found for each of the first three measures of happi-
ness (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.001); It is not found in the data collected
after round 35. This may be the result of habituation, i.e., players get
used to occasional deadlocks.32
• Second, deadlocks influence the extent to which players wish to (costly)
punish or reward other committee members after the experiment.
Rewards, punishments and emotions
As reported in section 2.2, as part of a debriefing, each player had the oppor-
tunity to reward or punish other players on the committee. As rewards and
punishments were costly and occurred after the experiment, one can think of
them as measuring substantive feelings about other players that apparently per-
sist when negotiations have ended. Such spill-over feelings may be important
for real life committees, as one may meet others on other occasions. Finding
compromises is facilitated by good interpersonal relationships (see Thagard and
Kroon, 2006). Hence, an optimal setup of a committee should avoid punish-
ment, as this signals strong negative feelings which may diminish cooperation
in repeated interactions.
In our experiment, 51.6% of the subjects made use of the opportunity to
reward and/or punish. We find clear evidence that members who veto the last
proposal are punished (see figure 6): subjects blocking last proposals are on
average punished by 26.9 eurocents (-34.1, -19.5 and -23.6 eurocents in NR, ER
32This result is not driven by the number of vetoes, as in the later rounds the number of
vetoes does not decrease significantly.
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Figure 6: Rewards and punishments
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and NR, while those who do not are (on average) rewarded by 4.9 eurocents
(5.7, 5.7 and 3.4 eurocents in NR, ER and UR). Additional analysis shows that
the number of subjects causing a deadlock is substantially greater under the NR
treatment than under the two rotation treatments (28% of all players blocked
one or more last proposals under no rotation, whereas only 19% of the subjects
did so under the two rotation treatments). Deadlocks occur more often in the
NR treatment, and this is regarded as sufficiently negative to make subjects
willing to punish, even though the experiment was completed when they made
these decisions.
Rewards and punishments are not related to total earnings (that is, it is
not the case that ‘low income’ members are rewarded or ‘high income’ members
are punished). Further analysis reveals differences in rewards and punishments
between treatments. First, subjects spend significantly more money to reward
or punish in NR than in ER (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.02). Second, slightly
more money is spent under unequal rotation than under equal rotation (Mann-
Whitney test, p = 0.07). Both findings can be explained as follows: subjects
who do not rotate (i.e., the ones with permanent voting rights) feel a stronger
‘emotional interest’ in the performance of the committee. This clearly shows
up in the UR treatment: distinguishing the two large regions, we find that the
region with the permanent seat spends about twice as much on rewards and
punishments than the ‘rotating’ large region (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.09).
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Rewards and punishments can be interpreted as a sign that strong emotions
occur. Since participants report their emotions before they rewarded or pun-
ished (see section 2.1) we can cross-check this information with the propensity to
punish/reward other committee members. Indeed, we do not find differences in
the ‘level’ of emotions between the treatments, but in the extent to which they
generate punishments. Data reveal that three negative emotions (anger, irrita-
tion and contempt) significantly influence punishments,33 but the relationship
between negative emotions and punishments is (i) stronger in unequal rotation
than in the other two treatments, (ii) stronger for the large region with perma-
nent voting rights than for the rotating large region, and (iii) stronger for the
larger regions than for the smaller regions. Rewarding is less straightforward to
interpret as rewards and emotions are not statistically correlated in our data.34
The data on emotions, and rewards/punishments can also be interpreted as
measures of the attractiveness of the different decision-making procedures. As
punishments under equal rotation are relatively low, this voting system seems to
produce a minimum of frustration among the committee members. Participants
may view equal rotation as the ‘fairest’ decision-making procedure for rotation,
as all participants get to vote equally often. An important caveat in this regard
is, however, that the experiment was set up in very symmetrical way, i.e., every
player had equal opportunities to ‘exploit’. Suppose that one of the players
differs substantially from the rest of the group (maybe because the region he
represents is economically very different). In this case the player may not have
equal opportunities to recoup the losses his region faces when he is not allowed
to vote. It is likely that in such situations this player’s frustration might increase
quite sharply under any form of rotation.
4 Conclusion
Our main results can be summarized as follows:
• First, rotation is likely to induce distributional effects. With rotation
voting committee members have additional scope to promote their own
interests (as opposed to maximizing the total committee payoff). Conse-
quently, their earnings increase relative to non-voting committee members;
Having permanent voting rights increases own payoff even more.
33The correlation between emotion and punishment is 0.25, 0.15 and 0.21 for anger, irritation
and contempt, respectively.
34As Sefton et al. (2007) argue rewarding is generally less well-understood than sanctioning.
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• Second, all committee members could have increased their earnings by vot-
ing for the option with the highest total committee payoff in each round.
By trying to maximize their own (round) payoffs, voting members get
caught in a prisoner’s dilemma-like situation. This effect seems stronger
without rotation than with rotation.
• Third, committees using a rotation scheme decide faster. Without rota-
tion, committees tend to block decisions more frequently.35
• Fourth, there is a positive correlation between deadlocks and reported
frustration by subjects. Subjects vetoing last proposals get punished, even
though this is only possible after the experiment.
The design of the experiment captures various important aspects of real life
committee decision making (albeit in a highly stylized manner), such as the
U.N. Security Council, WTO trade negotiatons, or monetary policymaking.
Consider the U.S. Federal Reserve System: it is composed of a central ‘hub’ –
the Board in Washington – and twelve regional ‘spokes’ (the regional Federal
Reserve Banks, which are scattered across the country). The FOMC, the body
responsible for U.S. monetary policy, is comprised of seven Board members and
the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, plus four of the other
eleven regional FED Presidents. Among the latter the right to vote rotates
following a pre-determined sequence.36 The twelve FED districts are not equal
in size (whether measured in terms of economic size or population).
In various respects, our design can be related to procedures of the FOMC:
we have (i) regions of different sizes, (ii) a region with a permanent seat and
(iii) the trade-off between common and individual interests. Meade and Sheets
(2005) suggest that at least some FOMC members face a trade-off between
regional and ‘common’ interests. Given these similarities, our results indicate
that decisions taken by the FOMC need not always maximize aggregate welfare.
Our experimental study indicates that FOMC members may use their right to
35For monetary policy committees timeliness of a decision may not be paramount, but for
other committees – e.g., the U.N. Security Council – the ability to reach a compromise may
be very important.
36The 1942 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act prescribes a rotation scheme of four seats
on the FOMC among eleven Federal Reserve districts. This annual rotation began on March
1, 1943; since 1990, the rotation has taken place each year on January 1. One voting seat is
rotated in a fixed fashion among members of each of the following FED districts: Cleveland
and Chicago; Atlanta, Dallas, and St. Louis; Boston, Philadelphia, and Richmond; Kansas
City, Minneapolis, and San Francisco (see Meade and Sheets, 2005). Johnson (1995) provides
a good summary of the founding of the Federal Reserve.
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vote to address economic conditions in their regions, rather than addressing the
interest of the U.S. economy as a whole. This is consistent with the empirical
findings of Chappell et al. (2004), who show that non-voting FOMC members
do not appear to have much influence on FOMC decision making. Relative to
a situation where all FOMC members vote, U.S. monetary policy may thus be
biased. In addition, decisions also may be systematically biased in favour of
the New York FED, as it has a permanent seat. That said, regional representa-
tion has a number of advantages, e.g., ensuring broad regional representation,
gathering and sharing of regional information by regional FED Presidents, etc.,
which are not captured in our experimental design. These are clearly issues for
future research.
Appendix A: Theoretical predictions
Overview
In determining how subjects behave we can distinguish two alternative ap-
proaches: first, own interests dominate group interests. This can come in the
form of ‘quasi-naive’ or ‘strategic’ voting: quasi-naive voting requires that par-
ticipants simply vote for their first-best option, without considering possible
strategic interactions. ‘Strategic’ voting is possible as every member has perfect
information about all committee members’ preferences, so backward induction
applies. Alternatively, it could be the case that committee interests are more
important than individual interests. In that case individuals could strive to
maximize the total payoff for the committee as a whole (i.e., the sum of private
and common payoffs of all committee members), or simply aim at the highest
common payoff.
Tables 5 and 6 contain theoretical predictions for the five behavioral modes
we consider. For each mode, we have included in the table (top rows) theoretical
predictions with respect to: (i) efficiency (Committee payoff): the total payoff
of all committee members if options predicted by the mode are agreed upon, (ii)
foregone efficiency measured as the shortfall of the mode predicted committee
payoff from the maximum possible committee payoff, (iii) Gini Index of the
income distribution at an option predicted by the behavioral mode, (iv) foregone
equity measured as the shortfall of the mode predicted Gini Index from the
minimum possible Gini Index and (v) range of payoffs (as another measure of
inequality) measured as the difference between the highest and the lowest payoffs
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(in eurocents) at options predicted by the mode. Predicted winning options for
each mode and for each round are also reported. The five behavioral modes we
consider are:
• Quasi-naive voting: Players make sincere proposals and vote sincerely
(absence of any strategic behavior) and always accept the last proposal
(avoiding this way a deadlock);
• Strategic voting: 37 Players behave strategically both in proposing options
and vetoing them;
• Maximum common payoff: Players propose and accept only options that
maximize the common payoff;
• Maximum committee payoff: Players propose and accept only options that
maximize the total committee payoff.
• Median voter decisive: Players accept only the most preferred option by
the median player of the committee members who have the right to vote.
37A formalized derivation of (stage game) subgame perfect equilibria for this mode is avail-
able upon request.
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Table 5: Theoretical predictions
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a(Maximum Committee Payoff, Minimum Gini Index, Minimum Range of Payoffs)
bQuasi-naive voting
cStrategic voting
dMedian voter decisive
eMaximum common payoff
fMaximum committee payoff
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Table 6: Theoretical predictions (cont. rounds 21-50)
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aQuasi-naive voting
bStrategic voting
cMedian voter decisive
dMaximum common payoff
eMaximum committee payoff
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Appendix B: Statistical tests of key findings
Non-proposers vs. proposers within treatments
Treatment NR ER UR
Earnings (non-proposers, proposers) (433, 442) (422, 468) (423, 475)
t-test -9.3 [± 5.1]0.07 -46 [± 4.1]0.00 -52 [± 4.3]0.00
Mann-Whitney test z=-1.710.09 z=-8.640.00 z=-8.390.00
Proposers across treatments
Treatment (NR, ER) (ER, UR) (NR, UR)
Earnings (442, 468) (468, 475) (442, 475)
t-test -25 [± 4.4]0.00 -7 [± 4.0]0.71 -27 [± 4.5]0.00
Mann-Whitney test z=-5.320.00 z=-0.720.47 z=-5.750.00
Non-proposers across treatments
Treatment (NR, ER) (NR, UR)
Earnings (433, 422) (433, 423)
t-test 11 [± 4.8]0.02 10 [± 5.0]0.02
Mann-Whitney test z=2.670.01 z=2.930.00
Total group earnings across treatments
Treatment (NR, ER) (ER, UR) (NR, UR)
Group Earnings (2192, 2248) (2248, 2271) (2192, 2271)
t-test -57 [± 24.0]0.02 -23 [± 20.0]0.86 -79 [± 29.0]0.07
Mann-Whitney test z=-2.180.03 z=-0.100.92 z=-1.640.10
Note: Two-sided p-values in supercripts; standard errors in square brackets
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Instructions (not for publication)
The following instructions38 were distributed during the equal rotation treat-
ment. Largely similar instructions were handed out during the other treatments,
the main difference being that in the no rotation treatment information on rota-
tion was not included and the number of committee members to take a decision
was five (in place of three).
Introduction
In today’s experiment you can earn money. How much depends on the deci-
sions which you take and the decisions of other participants. It will not be
possible to link your decisions to your name, not even after the experiment.
Hence anonymity is guaranteed. Below you will find the instructions for the ex-
periment. While reading the instructions and during the experiment you must
remain silent and must not communicate with others. If you have a question,
raise your hand. Someone will then come to you to answer the question.
Types and groups in the experiment
In the experiment you will be one of two types. You will be either type small
or type large. Your type plays a role in calculating the earnings, as will be
explained below. What type you will be has been decided at random. But note
that you will remain the same type throughout the experiment.
In the experiment everyone will be part of a group of five people. In each
group, so including your group, there are always three types small and two types
large. Every participant will be given a number, with his or her type added in
brackets, for instance ‘2 (large)’ or ‘4 (small)’. In the experiment the following
will always apply: participants 2 and 5 from your group will always be type
large, while participants 1, 3 and 4 will always be type small.
Note that the composition of each group will remain the same throughout
the experiment. You will always stay with the same participants in your group,
and each of you will keep his or her number and type throughout the experiment.
The distribution of participants across types and groups is random. We have
already assigned a type and group to each table. Because you drew your table
number in the reception room, the distribution is completely random.
38Instructions are translated from Dutch.
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Group decision and earnings
The experiment consists of 50 rounds. In each round your group must take
a decision. How the group takes a decision is explained below. The decision
concerns a choice between four options, ‘option 1’, ‘option 2’, ‘option 3’ and
‘option 4’. Each option yields both private earnings and common earnings. All
earnings are expressed in eurocents. We will now explain the earnings.
1. Private earnings:
For everyone in your group, each option will yield a certain private earning.
These private earnings are equal to one of the following four amounts:
25, 100, 200 or 350 eurocents. Note that if your group does not take a
decision (see below), then everyone in your group will receive earnings
of only 10 eurocents. It is possible that different options will yield the
same earnings. But there is always only one option for which you will
receive 350 eurocents. As the number of any other option is lower than
the number of this option (for which you will receive 350 eurocents), the
earnings will be lower. We will illustrate this in the example below.
Example
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
1 (small) 200 350 200 100
2 (large) 100 200 350 200
3 (small) 200 350 200 100
4 (small) 100 200 350 200
5 (large) 25 100 200 350
For participant 1 (small), option 2 yields the highest earnings. Options 1
and 3 yield earnings of 200 for this participant, option 4 yields earnings
of 100. The distribution of the private earnings across the options can
be regarded as a mountain, with the summit for participant 1 (small)
at option 2. The further away from the summit, the lower the earnings.
Thus for participant 5 (large) the summit of the mountain is at option 4
and the options further away from option 4 yield lower earnings for this
participant, down to 25 eurocents for option 1.
Note that the location of the summit (i.e. the option with earnings of
350 eurocents) changes for you and the other participants in your group
over the rounds. Everyone will have, over all rounds, 12 rounds with the
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summit at option 1, 12 rounds with the summit at option 2, 12 rounds
with the summit at option 3 and 12 rounds with the summit at option 4.
In the last two rounds of the experiment, the summit will be randomly
chosen for each participant. In the experiment everyone will thus be equal
in terms of the number of occasions on which a certain distribution of the
private earnings can occur.
During the experiment you will receive information in each round about
the private earnings of the other people in your group, in the form of the
table used as an example above.
2. Common earnings:
In addition to private earnings, each option will also yield common earn-
ings, which will be same for everyone in the group. The common earnings
for a particular option are a weighted average of the private earnings for
that option. In this case type large will have a greater weight than type
small (hence the labels ‘large’ and ‘small’). The private earnings of type
large for a particular option will have a weight of 35 % and those of type
small will weigh for 10 % in the calculation of the collective earnings. Note
that this weighting will only be applied in the calculation of the common
earnings.
On the basis of the above example we will illustrate how the common
earnings for a particular option will be calculated. Let us look at option
1. This option yields private earnings of 200 for participant 1 (small),
private earnings of 100 for 2 (large), private earnings of 200 for 3 (small),
private earnings of 100 for 4 (small) and private earnings of 25 for 5 (large).
Because type large has a weight of 0.35 and type small a weight of 0.10,
the common earnings are equal to 0.10*200 + 0.35*100 + 0.10*200 +
0.10*100 + 0.35*25 = 94 eurocents (rounded to full cents). Thus for option
1 everyone in the group will receive common earnings of 94 eurocents.
In the experiment you will not have to calculate the collective earnings
yourself. For each option you will receive information about both the
private earnings and the common earnings.
3. Total earnings:
Your total earnings for an option are the sum of your private earnings and
the common earnings. In the example the total earnings for participant 1
35
(small) for option 1 are equal to 200 (individual) + 94 (common) = 294
eurocents; while for participant 2 (large), for instance, the total earnings
for option 1 are equal to 100 (individual) + 94 (common) = 194 eurocents.
Again, you will not have to calculate your total earnings for an option.
This information will be provided for all options.
Rotation and voting procedures for group decisions
As mentioned, your group has to choose an option in each round. The following
procedure will be used. In each round only three participants can vote on the
option to be chosen. Which of the three participants can vote in a particular
round has been determined in advance. You have just received what is called a
rotation scheme. This scheme shows which three participations are allowed to
vote (marked with +) in each of the 50 rounds. In the first round, for instance,
this will be 1 (small), 3 (small) and 4 (small). Note that over all rounds each
participant in the group will rotate to the same extent. In total everyone in the
group will be allowed to vote in 30 of the 50 rounds. Hence there is no difference
between participants of type large and type small in this respect. Furthermore,
in each round one voting participant will be replaced by one of the non-voters.
The three participants who are allowed to vote will do so as follows. In
each round a sequence will be decided in which these three participants have to
propose an option. This sequence is announced to everyone at the start of a
round. A possible sequence would be 3 (small), 2 (large) and 4 (small). This
means that participant 3 (small) must be the first to make a proposal, followed
by 2 (large) and then 4 (small). Note that over all rounds, each participant
makes the first, second or third proposal on the same number of occasions.
When a proposal is put to the vote, each of the voters (excluding the pro-
poser) must indicate simultaneously whether they agree with the proposal or
whether they veto it. There are then two possibilities: either everyone agrees
or there are one or two vetoes. If everyone agrees, the proposal is approved.
Everyone (including the non-voting participants) will then receive total earnings
associated with the proposed option. If a proposal is vetoed by one or two of
the voting participants, the proposed option is rejected. In that case the voting
participant whose turn it is to put forward a proposal will then do so. Note that
the next proposal must always be a different one, that is, be another option. If
the third and last proposal is also rejected, then only one option remains (since
there are four options). If this is option is not approved either (because of one
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or two vetoes), then the group has not chosen an option. Note that if no option
is chosen, everyone in the group (including the non-voting participants) will
receive total earnings of only 10 eurocents in the round in question.
After a proposal has been put to vote, you will receive information on how
the voters in your group voted. Note that when a proposal is put to vote, each
of the voters (except the proposer) in the group has to vote simultaneously.
Then the votes cast in your group are made public to the group. You will then
know exactly who in your group agreed with the proposal and who may have
vetoed it.
Information on previous rounds
During the experiment you will have information on all previous rounds. For
each round this information consists of the collective and the total earnings for
the various options for each participant in your group, all proposals and voting
records in your group, as well as the options chosen (including ‘no decisions’).
Payment procedure
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be calculated and paid out. The
following procedure will be used. The computer will select at random 10 rounds
from all 50 rounds. Your total earnings for these rounds will be summed up,
and this will constitute your actual earnings. Your earnings from the experiment
will be paid in cash and in private.
Questions to be answered
During and at the end of the experiment you will be asked several questions.
Your answers will not be divulged to others, neither during nor after the ex-
periment. Your answers cannot be linked to your name. Hence anonymity is
guaranteed also for the analysis of the results of the experiment.
Explanation of computer screen and trials
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, we provide a short ex-
planation of the information which you will later see on your computer screen.
Then we ask you to answer several trial questions. After the trial questions,
we play two trial rounds. You cannot earn any money during the trial rounds.
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Their purpose is to familiarize you with the computer screens and the proce-
dures. You can still ask questions during the trial rounds. Once the trial rounds
have been completed, the experiment will start and you can start to earn money.
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